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Currentcost containment strategies will undoubtedly result in
fewer health services for patients. The analytical framework presented
in this paper shows how the effects of reductions in services on health
and social welfare depend upon the amount and distribution of services
(relative to potential benefit) prior to cost containment and on the
size and selectivity of the reductions. Disagreement over whether cost
containment has gone too far arises from disagreements about the
criterion (health or social welfare), the prior distribution, and how
selective the reductions will be. In the long run selectivity will be
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Cost containment strategies are sweeping through the health care
system like fire through parched underbrush. Medicare's prospective
payment system based on diagnosis-related groups is leading the way,
with health maintenance organizations, preferred provider
organizations, state regulatory agencies, and deductibles and
coinsurance close behind. The reasons for the changes in health care
financing and organizations are well understood.' But what about
their effects? Over the long run the current revolution in health care
finance is likely to change every aspect of the health care system:
medical practice, medical education, medical research. The debate over
whether cost containment has gone too far has already begun. This
paper does not attempt to resolve that debate or to discuss all of the
eventual ramifications of cost containment. It does offer an
analytical framework for thinking about the direct effects of current
policies on health and social welfare.
How Cost Containment Works
Regardless of whether cost containment is sought through
competition or regulation or a combination of both, reductions in
spending on health care can be achieved in only three ways. First, the
producers of health care may be forced to increase poduction
efficiency, i.e., to deliver the same amount of services with fewer
inputs. Such gains in efficiency are always possible in every
£organization, but it is unlikely that they will prove to be a major
source of cost reduction. Even under the old payment systems there was
no reward for the inefficiency associated with using more resources for
a given amount of services. The inefficiencies that critics pointed to
had more to do with what care was delivered than how it was produced.
Second, even with the amount of services and production efficiency
unchanged, health care spending can be reduced by reducing the prices
paid for inputs. As with efficiency, it is always possible to squeeze
input prices a little- -totrim nurses' wages and physicians' fees and
drug industry profits. But it is highly unlikely that this will be the
major source of cost reduction, especially over the long run. In the
short run, supplies of inputs may be relatively inelastic and therefore
their prices can be squeezed. In the long run, however, nurses,
physicians, drug companies, and other inputs into health care must
receive competitive compensation or the supplies will not be forthcoming.
The third, and by far the most important way to contain costs is
to deliver fewer services. At the most fundamental level, cost
containment must mean fewer hospital admissions, shorter lengths of
stay, fewer t&sts and X-rays, and similar reductions across the
spectrum of care. Thus, the question about the effects of cost
containment can be restated: How will health and social welfare be
affected by a reduction in the amount of health services? This question
can be illuminated with the help of a few diagrams.
Maximizing Health and Social Welfare
Figure la presents a stylized description of the relationship




Figure 1.Determination of the amounts of services








Amount of servicesquantitative and qualitative dimensions. For instance, an increase in
the amount of care can be thought of as an increase in length of stay
in the hospital (holding services per day constant), or as an increase
in the number of tests per day, or as any combination of changes in
days and tests that results in more services. For each patient the
health benefit typically increases as the amount of services increases,
but at a decreasing rate. Eventually a point is reached, Q2, where the
health benefit is at a maximum, and additional services do more harm
than good. Figure la also shows that cost rises as the amount of
services increases. To simplify the presentation without undue violence
to reality, it is assumed that cost rises at a constant rate, i.e.,
each additional unit of service adds as much to cost as does the
preceding unit. If all the benefits of care are reflected in the health
curve, the amount of services that maximizes social welfare is Q1. If
any less care is provided, the benf it would decrease more than the
cost; if any amount greater than Q1 is provided, cost would increase
more than the benefit.2
The basis for defining the amounts of services that maximize
health and maximize social welfare can perhaps be seen more clearly in
Figure ib, which shows the marginal (i.e., additional) benefit and
marginal cost curves derived from the total benefit and total cost
curves of Figure la. The exact shape of the marginal benefit curve will
vary from disease to disease and from patient to patient, but the
marginal benefit, on average, surely declines as the amount of services
increases, and eventually becomes negative. Overall, the linear
approximation may not be far off, and greatly simplifies the analysis.
4The Effects of Less Care
What happens as cost containment strategies reduce the amount of
services? The answer clearly depends on how much is being provided.
Any reductions that occur to the right of Q2 will result in an
improvement in health; reductions to the left of Q2 will decrease
health. For social welfare, Q1 is the critical point. Reductions in the
amount of services to the right of Q1 increase social welfare (because
they reduce cost more than benefit); reductions to the left decrease
social welfare (because they reduce benefit more than cost). Thus, the
effect of cost containment on health may differ from the effect on
social welfare; any reductions between Q2 and Q1 would simultaneously
decrease health and increase social welfare. Both effects, however,
depend on the initial distribution of patients by amount of services
and on the change in services.
It is reasonable to assume that prior to cost containment
different patients are receiving different amounts of services
(relative to potential benefit); a stylized description of such a
frequency distribution is presented in Figure 2. Some patients are
receiving th& amount that maximizes the health benefit, Q2; some are
receiving more, and some less. Some patients may not even be receiving
as much as Q1. This distribution and the size and pattern of the
reduction in services determine the changes in health and social
welfare. Consider the following hypothetical scenarios.
1) Equal absolute reductions
Suppose that cost containment results in a uniform absolute
reduction, a, in the amount of services received by each patient. For




Figure 2. Hypothetical distributionof patients.
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Qieach patient has the same reduction of a days. The average effects on
health and social welfare will be determined by the size of the
reduction, a, and the mean (Q) of the distribution prior to the change.
More precisely, the change in health will be equal to a(— -1-
This means that health will increase, decrease, or stay the same, de-
pending on whether Q is greater than, smaller than, or equal to Q2 +a/2.
In the same way, the effect on social welfare will depend only on the
relationship between Q and Q1 +a/2.
2) Equal percentage reductions
Suppose that cost containment results in a uniform percentage
reduction, a, in the amount of services received by each patient. For
instance, suppose each length of stay is reduced by Q where Q is the
original amount. In that case, the effects on health and social welfare
will depend on the size of o, the mean of the distribution, Q, and the
variance (cr2) of the distribution. The larger is 2 the smaller can be
Q consistent with a favorable effect on health or social welfare. More
(2+a2)(2) -




This means that health will increase, decrease, or stay the same,
depending on whether Q is greater than, smaller than, or equal to
2Q2 ÷(l+C2)(2—cO, where C equals the coefficient of variation (i.e.,
standard deviation divided by mean of the distribution). For the effect
on social welfare, simply substitute Q1 for Q2.
Thus, in the case of equal percentage reductions, it is possible
for there to be no decrease in health even if Q is less than Q2
provided the coefficient of variation is sufficiently large and cY. not
tremendously large. Figure 3 shows the Q Q2 ratio that would result






Figure 3. Values of Q ÷
Q2
that would result in no change in health
as a function of C and a.
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Coefficient of variationinstance, if the coefficient of variation was .5 and the reduction in
care was 30 percent (c.3), there would be no change in health if
÷= .94.If Q ÷
Q2were greater than .94, a 30 percent reduction in
care would actually result in an increase in health; if it were
smaller, health would decrease. By substituting Q1 for Q2, Figure 3 can
be used to infer the Q ÷Q1ratios that would result in no change in
social welfare for different combinations of C and .
3)Unequal percentage reductions
If the reductions are selective; i.e., if the patients receiving
more services (relative to potential benefit) experience larger than
average percentage reductions, the effects on health and social welfare
will be more favorable than those in case 2 for any given values of Q
and C. Of course, if the reductions are perversely selective; i.e., if
those patients receiving fewer services (relative to potential benefit)
experience larger than average percentage reductions, the effects will
be less favorable than in case 2.
The Policy Debates
The foregoing analytical discussion should help to clarify key
aspects of the current debate about whether cost containment has gone
too far.
Disagreement over the criterion for ludging "too far." Which side
a person takes in this debate may depend on whether health or social
welfare is the criterion. It is certainly possible (many experts would
say probable) that reductions in the amount of services will
simultaneously decrease health but increase social welfare because the
value of the decreases in health will be smaller than the value of the
resources freed for other uses.
aDisagreement over the distribution prior to cost containment.
Even individuals who agree that health should be the criterion may
disagree about the distribution of patients with respect to Q2 prior
to cost containment. If Q is substantially to the right of Q2 (a large
amount of services that harm health), then equal absolute reductions in
care will not reduce health on average. Some patients will be hurt by
the reductions but others will benefit. Even if Q is to the left of Q2
it is still possible for equal percentage reductions to be benign if
the prior distribution has considerable variance.
Disagreement over how selective the reductions will be. Even
individuals who agree about the criterion and about the prior
distribution may disagree about how the reductions will be applied. If
reductions are selectively concentrated on those patients who were
receiving too much care, the effect will be very different than if the
reductions are exerienced by all patients.
In the absence of hard data it is not surprising that experts
differ in their estimates of the prior distribution and of the
probability that reductions will be selective. Those who believe that
many patients 'receive excessive care and that the variance is large can
point to the uneven incidence of surgery across geographical areas4 and
to the findings of the Rand Health Insurance Experiment. In that
experiment cost-sharing resulted in substantial reductions in the
amount of care received by some families, but no major effects on
health were observed for either adults or children.5'6
On the other hand, a study of the effects of Medicare and Medicaid
on utilization of surgical operations casts doubt on the ability of
patients to reduce care selectively when faced with less insurance
10coverage. Urban nonwhites experienced an increase of 50 percent in
their utilization of 11 selected surgical procedures after the
government insurance programs went into effect, but the average level
of urgency or necessity of the procedures performed on these patients
was the same as it was prior to Medicare and Medicaid.7 If any
selectivity had been present during the period of limited or no
insurance, the average level of urgency and necessity should have
fallen as utilization increased. There is no doubt that deductibles and
coinsurance can induce consumers to demand less medical care, but given
the complexity of many medical decisions, it is questionable whether
consumers know which services to cut back on and which to retain.
Selectivity will become increasingly important as the reductions
in amount of care (relative to potential benefit) grow larger. The more
selective the reductions, the greater can be the decrease in cost for
any given change in health or social welfare. This suggests that the
question "Is cost containment being pursued in the best possible way?"
may be as important as how far it is pursued. Those strategies such as
prepaid group practice that rely on physicians to contain costs are
likely to result in more selective reductions than those relying on
patients' responses to cost sharing because physicians have more
understanding of the potential effects on health of alternative
protocols. Moreover, the improvement and expansion of research and
education programs designed to increase that understanding will be




1. Equal absolute reductions
If the marginal benefit curve is linear and we define the marginal
benefit of the first unit of care as 1, then when the amount of care is Q
the marginal benefit equals 1 — Therefore,if each patient receives
a fewer units of care, the change in health for a patient initially receiving
Q units is equal to
Q—a 2Q—a
j(1-—)dQ =Q— = a(---—1—
Q '<2 Q
Since the expected value of any linear function of Q is the same
function of Q (the mean of Q), the average change in health
— Q a
2 2
Therefore, AH0 when Q =
Q2+ -
Forthe social welfare calculation, costs and benefits are measured
relative to the marginal cost line, rather than the horizontal axis. When
the amount of care is Q the marginal effect on social welfare equals 1 —
'<1
Substituting Q1 for Q2 in the above equations gives the change in social
welfare.
122. entage reductions
If each patient receives cxQfewerunits (where cx is a proportion
between 0 and 1), the change in health for a patient initiallyreceiving
Qunitsis equal to
2I Q—cxQ 2 (l--)dQ-Q——
=
JQ Q2Q 2
Sincethis function is ratic in Q,wecannot simply replace Q
withQintaking the expected value. The expected value of QisQbutthe
expected value of Q2isQ2+ G2. Thus,the average change in health
=(Q+G)(2)-
Therefore,tH =0when Q= 2Q2÷(l±C2)(2-cx)where C equals
Q Substitutionof Q1 for Q2providesthe measures for social welfare.
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